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Poles to develop their culture, while in his newspaper
A hundred million marks, that isn't a trifle it's enough to buy an entire province but it isn't a simple thing to exterminate the Polish spirit and Germany is too small. But these first shoots of Polish consciousness made no impression on the apathetic labouring classes, and remained politically insignificant.
In the following decade, these literary activities began to yield to a more political formulation of the Polish position, but it was given to a non-Upper Silesian to do the formulating. In the summer of I891, the Silesian Centre party leader Count Ballestrem started a debate by denying that the Polish-speaking, Catholic Upper Silesian could indeed be called a Pole. Over a year later, on 6 October I892, the Kuryer in turn chided Ballestrem on this supposed difference between the 'Great Pole', an inhabitant of the province of Posen (Poznan), and the 'Upper Silesian'. It not only asserted that the 'Great Pole' differed from the 'Upper Silesian' only as the Saxon differed from the German, but also labelled the phrase 'Grosspolnische Agitation' -which implied that Posen Poles were responsible for Upper Silesian unresta dishonourable survival from Bismarckian times.
In Korfanty's action, however, failed to do much more than register the dilemma of Upper Silesia, since a decade and a half later, after the first world war had ended, the question of Upper Silesia remained unsettled and troublesome. The victorious allies declared that the newly-enshrined principle of national self-determination should settle the fate of the province, but objections and complications arose. The objections were of a traditional nature, consisting mainly of German assertions that a Polish Upper Silesia would suffer mass starvation, since the newly resurrected Polish state lacked both the ability to absorb the industrial production of Upper Silesia and a transportation system which could carry these products to foreign markets; thus, a Polish Upper Silesia was doomed to economic collapse.8 The new complication demanded everyone's attention: even the Allies recognized that Upper Silesia was neither Polish nor German. It was both and neither.
While they considered this dilemma in conference rooms in Western Europe, the committed Pole and the committed German within the Upper Silesian population attempted to settle the issue locally: the Germans relying on government troops and the Poles using the strike. This led to an armed confrontation in August I9I9, and although by the 26th of that month the troops of the sixth German army corps commanded by General Horsing had ended both the Polish military resistance and the strike, the problem of what to do with Upper Silesia remained: neither census reports nor surveys of language ability could either award all of Upper Silesia to one state or the other, or provide a rational basis for the division of the province.
One year later, violence once more broke out. On 17 August, Germans gathered in Kattowitz and demonstrated for their cause.
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: UPPER SILESIA
By the next day they had wrecked a number of Polish businesses as well as Polish printing shops. By the 20th, the Poles had begun to march on the city and, within three days, they controlled most of the countryside just as the Germans controlled most of the cities. By the 27th, both sides, the Poles represented by Korfanty, agreed to cease hostilities. They even organized an auxiliary police force consisting of both Poles and Germans. Unrepresented were only the men and women who considered themselves neither German nor Pole.
However, these people were given a chance by the Allies to settle the issue on 20 March 1921. Unfortunately, the result of the plebiscite was unclear. Certainly, no one doubted the honesty of the count: slightly more than 700,000 votes for Germany and a little over 475,000 votes for Poland. But many interpreted the result as anything but a complete victory for Germany. Some said that the difficulties in organizing a new Poland after more than a century of foreign rule had frightened many Poles into voting for Germany. Others questioned the impact of the Jewish vote. Still others demanded a partition of the province -which would prove to be difficult since the German vote total was high in towns near the pre-war Russian (Congress Poland) border, and the Polish vote dominated in rural areas many miles to the west of these towns.
The expected occurred some six weeks later: for the third time violence was employed in an attempt to resolve this most insoluble of problems. Throughout the month of May, the fighting continued as Poles once more controlled the countryside and Germans defended the towns. And, once more, violence failed to achieve a settlement. The League of Nations on the other hand did impose a settlement in October, when it decided on a partition of Upper Silesia which placed Katowice in Poland and Oppeln in Germany. But an imposed settlement does not settle the issue itself: neither the Weimar Republic nor the Third Reich accepted the League's decision.
Yet even Hitler's propaganda ministry recognized the ambiguities of the Upper Silesian situation. In March 1935 it circulated an account of a talk by Professor Oberlander, later to be accused of war crimes by the Poles, in which he emphasized that many people in the border areas had not decided if they belonged to the German or Polish people.9 Publicity was also given to the charge that cer-tain of these families had used their situation and the eagerness of dedicated Germans and Poles to claim them as compatriots to reap material rewards: one family, for example, managed to extort Iooo marks from a German organization in exchange for sending its children to a German, rather than a Polish, school.
This theme of 'uncertain nationality' was not allowed to die. In November 1936, the propaganda ministry advised the press that in the Eastern borderlands there were a great many Germans with Polish names and a great many Poles with German names. In I938 the press was told that in many instances a man's mother tongue failed to indicate his nationality: this was said to be especially true in Upper Silesia, where 'in the plebiscite of I92I The report began by numbering the Polish people (which was said to include people of Polish-Jewish origin) at I7 million, while placing the 'Kaschuben, Masuren, Wasserpolen (Upper Silesians), Goralen' outside the bounds of the Polish community.12 It went on to say that in Upper Silesia there was a bloc of I to I million men and women who were neither German nor Pole. Ironically enough, the report admitted the influence of environment on 'race' by stating that the 'racially Nordic' groups in Poland had developed and now maintained that Polish Catholic identity which had to be destroyed if these people were ever to return to the Germanic fold. This was an implicit admission that political boundaries can make nationalities just as surely as nationalities can be the origin of political boundaries.
What was to be done with these people ? As believers in race, the writers of the report gave a warning against trying to make 'genuine Germans' out of 'racial Poles' by teaching them the German language; the only result would be a cheapening of the German people. The question to be settled was how to determine which people in this area of uncertain nationality could undergo a 'genuine' transformation into 'true' Germans: in November I939, the report had no answer.
It did advance the idea of a sifting process and introduce such concepts as 'citizenship on recall': if the person believed to have 'Germanic blood' failed to undergo a genuine transformation, he would lose his claim to German citizenship. It also suggested that people of this uncertain status should be allowed to join the HitlerJugend and the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, but only as rank-and-file members: they could neither occupy leading positions nor advance to membership in the Nazi party.
On 3 September I940 a directive from Himmler's office stated that no decision on the nationality of these people in East Upper Silesia -the area given to Poland in 1921 -had been reached.13 On the I2th, in a decree issued from the same office, it was admitted that a quick decision was impossible even though the Nazis had controlled the areas where these men and women lived for over a year.14 What had been decided was to divide the population into four categories: the first two covering Germans of various degrees of national consciousness, the third those whose nationality was uncertain, and the fourth Poles. But the old question remained: who was a Pole ? On I4 November I940, it was decided that people of uncertain nationality in Upper Silesia were not to be classified as Poles unless they considered themselves to be Poles. 15 Finally, in an attempt to settle the question, the government adopted the following programme: suitable elements from the third group -suitability to be judged on the basis of appearance and worldly success -were granted German citizenship on recall for a trial period often years: it was hoped that they could be brought to the Altreich to live and their behaviour observed during that decade. They could not join the Nazi party but they could join front organizations; they could not become officials, and they needed permission to attend institutions of higher education. But there were still difficulties, two in particular. First, some 'polonized Germans' refused to 'reconvert'. Himmler's only hope was that, if these people could not be won for the German cause, they could at least be prevented from continuing to act like good Poles.16 Second, it was reported that some of the inhabitants suddenly became German when they realized the material benefits flowing from this identity.17 Neither of these problems was solved before the collapse of the Reich.
When that happened, the problem was turned upside down. Since Poland now administered all of Upper Silesia, it paidespecially if one wished to avoid expulsion from the area -to be Polish. Those who earlier had suddenly discovered their German soul now experienced delight at the mere mention of Mickiewicz. But there were still many hundreds of thousands neither Polish nor German.
Even today this question remains alive and may prove troublesome. The draft treaty of December I970 between the Federal Republic and Poland, for instance, includes a Polish pledge to allow Germans living in present-day Poland to move to West Germany. But who is a German ? Der Spiegel (14 December I970) reported that the black market in Silesia had already begun to engage in activities which would enable individuals to take advantage of the agreement. What will be the reaction of the Polish government to their attempted emigration ? What will be the German reaction ?
It is clear that in this area a large number of people cannot be classified by nationality, from which it follows that political slogans such as the right of national self-determination merit careful scrutiny. Might it not be that the doctrine of national self-determination, rather than satisfying a real demand, has actually forced many people, as in the case of Upper Silesia, to acquire a nationality ?
